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Abstract 
This paper explores the u.s. sugar subsidy programs; specifically why an 
increasing amount of sugar subsidy is being allocated to a decreasing number of domestic 
sugar growers. Traditional neoclassical economic theory fails to capture the autonomous 
nature of political institutions in affecting the policy making decision regarding the sugar 
program. Douglass North offers an analytic framework for explaining the ways in which 
institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies. Two empirical 
models test the impact economic and political variables have on the level of sugar loans 
allocated to sugar growers. The House and Senate Agriculture Committees, and the 
number of democrats in the chambers of Congress contribute to explaining the variance of 
sugar subsidy loans. The Senate committee in particular emerges as statistically significant. 
Introduction 
Sugar growers continue to benefit from favorable economic conditions provided by 
the u.S. government. Yet empirical data reveal a decrease in the aggregate support for 
sugar legislation in recent years. In 1978, there were 9187 full or part owners of sugar 
cane and sugar beet farms, compared to 7,799 farms in 1987. The level of sugar subsidy 
allocated to the farmers, however, has increased and even favored certain sugar growers 
disproportionately over others. Such empirical findings suggests that politics, as much as 
economics, affect the level of sugar subsidy. This paper examines why an increasingly 
smaller number of sugar farmers receive larger government subsidies. 
Mainstream economics cannot explain the unusual linkage between sugar 
producers and subsidy levels. While traditional, neoclassical economists cultivate elegant 
models that explain economic phenomena, they fail to characterize correctly the relationship 
between voters, their elected representatives, and the political institutions which shape the 
policies. 
Consequently an accurate model must combine what we know from mainstream 
economics and political economy. Before outlining the theoretical framework, however, 
the following section reviews the history of the sugar subsidy. 
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History of Sugar Subsidy 
The Jones-Costigan Act, created the modern sugar program as part of the New Deal 
package of agricultural legislation in 1934. The program included domestic production 
controls and direct payments to farmers, as well as import restrictions that addressed the 
declining ratio of farm to non-farm incomes of the preceding decade (Harper, 1990). The 
first major transformation of the u.s. sugar program resulted from the u.s. trade embargo 
of Cuba's exports to the u.s. in 1963. Throughout the following years, the United States 
government imposed a series of price supports, import quotas, and loans to protect U.S. 
producers from lower-priced foreign grown sugar as well as to encourage domestic 
production of sugar (Rendelman, 1989). Many farmers in the u.s. began to supplement 
the dearth of sugar left by the embargo and exploit the "protected market" conditions 
provided by the U.S. government subsidy. 
Despite the federal aid granted to sugar growers, not all sectors of agriculture 
devoted to growing sugar derivatives flourished. Domestic production of sugar cane 
increased steadily from 1982 onward, while sugar beet production stagnated (Knutson 
1985). Through time, the largest number of sugar beet farmers were concentrated in a 
specific West/Midwest region of the U.S. (Minnesota, North Dakota, Idaho) while sugar 
cane farmers were found in the Southeast, specifically Louisiana and Florida. Farmers in a 
majority of states, then, did not receive positive economic or political incentives from the 
sugar subsidy. 
Perhaps more important, the number of farmers who received a subsidy for sugar 
cane and sugar beet derivatives decreased over time, while the level of subsidy increased. 
By 1995, the program peaked at over $500 million dollars in loans to U.S. sugar growers. 
The welfare cost to consumers has also increased over the years to over $1.9 billion 
dollars. Corn, the derivative of high fructose corn syrup, emerged as a strong competitor 
in the domestic sweetener market. While sugar held 72% of the domestic sweetener market 
in 1975, that share had fallen to 40% by 1987, suggesting that the number of farmers who 
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could vote to support sugar legislation (i.e. the political clout of sugar growers) had 
significantly diminished (Harper, 1988). 
Ironically, producer of such alternative sweeteners can increase the prices of their 
products according to the protected market price for sugar, resulting in high profit margins 
(Irving, 1988). Hence the producers of high fructose corn syrup have become active 
supporters of the sugar program (Monahan ,1992). 
In order to prevent excess domestic sugar from being dumped onto the world 
market at an economic loss to sugar growers, representatives of sugar refineries and 
constituencies that benefit from the sugar program have vigorously lobbied the Agriculture 
Committee of the House of Representatives to maintain a high domestic price support (see 
Graph 1). Since the current sugar program began in 1981, the sugar industry has 
contributed more than $11 million to campaigns of selected politicians in order to maintain 
the economic benefits of the sugar program (Chicago Tribune, 1995: 30 April). 
Despite the efforts of the sugar industry to maintain the level of sugar subsidy, the 
rising budget deficit is forcing the Republican-led Congress to reassess its support of a 
number of the major agricultural programs. Representative Dan Miller (R.-Fl.) vowed to 
kill the federal sugar subsidy program that provides a $1.9 billion annual windfall to U.S 
sugar growers (Regan, 1995). 
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Concerned taxpayers and manufacturers who demand sugar for consumption and 
production purposes are pressing the U.S. government to end the subsidy program for 
sugar growers and force them to join the competitive ranks of the world market. These 
groups who generate a demand for sugar feel the economic brunt of the sugar subsidies in a 
substantive way. They are shut out from the inexpensive world market price of sugar and 
instead find their tax dollars funding the price supports and interest free loans which 
guarantee the profit of sugar growers. Consumers are left to buy U.S. sugar at a price 
greater than fifty percent of world market prices, spurring politicians such as House 
Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) to declare that the sugar program was "the most 
costly cartel to American consumers since OPEC" (Regan, 1995). 
Literature Review 
Public Choice theory concentrates on translating voter preferences into policy 
choice. A majority of their scholarly work rests on the utility-maximizing, rational actor, 
who, by assumption, makes all decisions for policy outcomes on the basis of a range of 
idealized properties. These properties include perfect knowledge, stable goals, and zerb 
transaction costs I (Moe, 1985). With such favorable conditions, policy outcome is simply 
a "black box that produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any gIven 
environment" (Moe, 1985). 
A number of economists who were puzzled by the failure of regulatory and tariff 
policies to validate the normative economic theory attempted to explain the deviations 
through rational choice models of the legislative process. These economic theories "had 
treated policymakers as largely inert public interest maximizers who would faithfully 
implement the economists' canons" (Hayes, 1981). Public Choice scholars such as 
I Transaction costs, which are more clearly articulated in the theoretical framework section, involve the costliness of 
acquiring, evaluating, and measuring the information needed for economic actors to make perfectly informed 
decisions. 
.-.
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Mueller attempt to define the determinants and theoretical motivations of policy choice 
within different political systems (federal, state, and local). 
The public choice approach to non-market decision making has been...to make the 
same behavioral assumptions as general economics (rational, utilitarian man), often 
to depict the preference revelation process as analogous to the market (voters 
engage in exchange, via...reveal[ing] their demand schedules... (Mueller, 1979: 3). 
But such a framework, assumes that "rational" decisions are made in a frictionless 
unIverse. 
Moreover, many economists argue that the weakness of rational choice theory lies 
in its failure to enhance the general knowledge of how human nature and organization 
interact under political constructs (Shapiro and Green, 1994). Consequently, when many 
rational choice models are subjected to empirical testing, their validity is often called into 
question. Ironically, Mueller and others defend public choice theory because lithe use of 
the simplified models of political behavior is justified so long as they outperform the 
competitors in explaining political behavior" (Mueller, 1979). Downs, for example argued 
that policymakers, like firms and consumers, should be viewed as self-interest maximizers 
in a more realistic theory of the policy process. 
This paper argues that choice-theoretic literature often ignores the independent 
impact of political institutions on policy choice. In order to find economic theories that 
incorporate the effect of political institutions on economic performance, one must turn to 
literature concentrated in political economy. Douglass North (1992) introduces the 
autonomous nature of political systems into the neoclassical economic paradigm through 
his analysis of institutions and their role in determining policy choice. Political scientists 
recognize that North's "transaction-cost analysis is a decided extension of the view of 
politics as merely a series of exchange of benefits: (Browne) 1995). Unlike previous 
economic theories that suggest institutions are solely designed to achieve efficient outcomes 
and play no independent role in economic performance, North argues that institutions 
provide the structure for exchange which in turn determines the cost of political and 
economic exchange. 
•
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Theoretical Framework 
Institutions directly impact economic outcomes, such as subsidy payments over 
time by altering the costs of political exchange between voters and representatives. 
Empirical evidence tends to support North's theory; Congress has continued to support a 
policy that benefits a small group of farmers at the expense of so many because they are 
influenced by the political system and the relative power of interest groups (Sturgiss, 
1990). 
These interest groups, such as the political action committees (PACS) continuously 
lobby legislators and the Executive Branch to influence sugar policy making (Sturgiss, 
1990). Accordingly, the more money PACs contribute to congressional campaigns, the 
greater the amount of subsidy allocated to sugar growers. PACs, however, are not alone in 
influencing sugar policy making. 
The power of congressional committees in the U.S. political system allows sugar 
interests to influence policy making by developing relationships with only a few key 
legislators (Monahan, 1992). In order to account for the level of sugar subsidy, as 
Monahan suggests, it is important to note what legislators come from sugar producing 
states and how many sit or chair the salient committees in Congress. Politicians who serve 
on the agriculture committee and represent areas with a level of sugar production would be 
expected to increase the level of sugar subsidy granted to domestic growers. 
Institutions are not necessarily created to be socially efficient, but are created to 
serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules. Whereas a strict 
neoclassical view of economics asserts that institutions induce the actors to acquire the 
essential information that will lead to "efficient policy choices," North argues that 
individuals will often act on incomplete information due to the cost of accurately measuring 
the worth of the good, services, or performance of an agent and will instead use 
subjectively derived models that are frequently erroneous. 
•
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In the case of the sugar subsidy, political institutions provide a bartering system 
where voter preferences are distorted by a number of groups or institutions. Other political 
scientists, such as Barry Weingast, corroborate North's theory through their research. 
Weingast found that legislators act in their own self-interest by establishing norms and 
forming institutions which further their goals although they may not meet any economic 
cost/benefit criteria (Weingast, 1979). 
One norm under which legislators often operate is party identification. Since 1965, 
a Democratic House supported the development of the current sugar subsidy program. As 
the number of Democratic senators and representatives declined over time, it is important to 
test what, if any effect this political shift has had on the level of sugar subsidy over time. 
Democrats have traditionally supported a more liberal approach to government influence in 
economic market systems. Because of this, it is expected that as the number of Democrats 
decrease in either chamber, the level of sugar subsidy would decrease. 
When attempting to gauge the effect of political variables upon the level of sugar 
subsidy, it is important to realize that political institutions, as North suggests, are operated 
through formal constraintsz . Formal constraints include political and economic rules and 
contracts and define the hierarchical structure of the polity, its basic decision structure and 
the explicit characteristics of agenda control. Formal constraints are the driving force 
behind the creation of policy. For instance, there are a myriad of subcommittees, 
committees, and votes in both houses that a policy such as the sugar subsidy must go 
through before it can be implemented on a large scale. This would also lead to the 
assumption that party identification would also impact the level of sugar subsidy granted to 
farmers. 
The level of import quotas and domestic price supports have negatively impacted 
the sugar market. Scholars have found that U.S. sugar policy consistently undermines the 
Z Infonnal constraints are the constructs which guide socially transmitted infonnation through human interaction. 
Due to the subtle and complex nature of quantifying informal constraints, this paper will empirically address only 
fonnal constraints. 
•
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u.s. foreign policy goal of assisting Third World economic development. Yearly 
decreases in U.S. sugar imports contributed to the collapse of sugar industries of the 
poorest countries in the world (Sturgiss 1990). In tracking the level of sugar subsidies 
granted to farmers, it is important to monitor the amount of sugar production by foreign 
markets. Moreover, this decline in import quota levels indirectly warrants increasing price 
supports for domestic sugar growers who must supply the U.S. with sugar (see Graph 2). 
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This graph shows the direct effect of Congress' initiatives to protect the domestic sugar 
market. The level of sugar allowed into the United States peaked in 1977 at 6,138,000 
short tons and has steadily decreased to a low of 1,200,000 short tons in 1989. 
Empirical data also reveals that the U.S. is an inefficient and high cost sugar 
producer when compared to many Third World sugar exporting countries (lves, 1988). 
Although U.S. growers claim that their industry is one of the most efficient in the world 
because of its high yields per acre, the U.S. falls near the middle in international cost 
comparison rankings (Landell Mills, 1990). From this chain of events, it can be construed 
that the level of sugar subsidy granted to domestic producers is causally linked to the 
10 
viability of foreign sugar production. Conversely, the international price of sugar would 
also be affected by economic protectionism of the U.S. sugar market. As the world price 
increases, the level of sugar subsidy would decrease because there would be a greater 
economic incentive to utilize domestic sugar and the need for artificial supports would be 
minimal. 
In an attempt to reconcile such damaging effects on the foreign sugar industry, a bill 
was introduced in the House of Representatives in March 1989 that would have provided a 
minimum floor on import quotas for countries within the Caribbean basin. The Bush 
administration, however, declared the bill's preferential nature to the Caribbean inconsistent 
with U.S. trade philosophy. The bill lost momentum and ultimately failed (Monahan, 
1992), 
This paper will also test how the level of domestic sugar production compares with 
total domestic agricultural production (see Graph 3). 
Graph 3 
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Using basic supply and demand theory, if the ratio between domestic sugar production and 
total domestic agricultural production of sugar increases, the level of subsidies would 
decrease due to the already established high demand for sugar in the United States. 
Consequently, there would be less incentive for the government to create artificial supports 
•
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for a commodity that is selling well on its own. As Graph 3 shows, the ratio has remained 
consistent over time. 
There are other important economic variables to test in this research model. As 
Americans have decreased their consumption of sugar since the 1960s, one would expect 
the level of subsidies to increase in order to offset a lower equilibrium price due to the lack 
of domestic demand for sugar. 
Hypotheses 
This paper will test the impact of the following economic and political variables upon the 
level of sugar loans allocated to sugar farmers. This study posits the following 
hypotheses. 
Consumption of Sugar (CONSUME) 
As the amount of sugar consumed increases, the amount of loans granted 
to sugar growers decreases due to the increased consumer demand for sugar. 
Ratio of domestic sugar production 
to total agricultural production (RTSGPAGP)
 
If this ratio increases, the amount of sugar loans will decrease because of
 
the increased consumer demand for sugar.
 
Ratio of domestic sugar production 
to total world sugar production (WORLD) 
If this ratio increases, the amount of sugar loans will decrease 
because of the increased demand for domestic sugar on the world market 
International Price of Sugar (INT.$SUG) 
As the world price increases, the level of loans will decrease because of 
the decrease in price differential between U.S. sugar and world sugar prices. 
Number of Senate Agricultural 
committee members that are from 
sugar producing states (SENCOMM) + 
As the number of senate members from sugar producing states increases, 
the level of loans will increase because they want to meet the financial 
requests of their constituents. 
Number of House Agricultural 
committee members that are from 
sugar producing states (HOSCOMM) + 
As the number of house members from sugar producing states increases, 
the level of loans will increase because they want to meet the financial 
requests of their constituents. 
•
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Number of Democrats in Senate (NUMDEMS) 
As the number of Democrats in the senate increase, the amount of loans 
will increase because they advocate government support of farm programs. 
+ 
Number of Democrats in House (NUMDEMH) 
As the number of Democrats in the house increase, the amount of loans 
will increase because they advocate government support of farm programs. 
+ 
Results 
The data presented in these models were collected from a combination of sources. 
All of the political variables tested (number of Democrats in the House and Senate, the 
number of agricultural committee members from sugar producing states) were gathered 
from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac through 1965 to 1992. World sugar 
production data came from the United Nations Statistical Tables 1992. Data regarding the 
number of sugar beet and sugar cane farms came from selected volumes of the U.S. 
Agriculture Census, 1978-1987. The remaining economic indicators were found in the 
United States Statistical Abstracts from 1965-1992. Lobby data was obtained from the 
Federal Election Commission files covering the years of 1977-1992. 
Sugar loans 
The independent variables listed in the on the following page are tested against one 
of the dependent variables that comprise the sugar subsidy; specifically loans. The level of 
loans granted to sugar growers varies significantly between 1965-1992. In order to gain a 
better sense of the findings, the economic variables that are tested against the amount of 
loans are presented first, then followed by the regression results which incorporate the 
political variables. Both models present reported significance levels. The 
t-statistics follow and are presented in parentheses. 
•
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Modell 
u.s. Loans to Sugar 
Growers Against Selected 
Economic Variables 
INT.$SUG .1107 
(-1.688) 
RTSGPAGP .8070 
(-.248) 
WORLD .6977 
(.395) 
CONSUME .4834 
(.718) 
NUMDEMS 
NUMDEMH 
SENCOMM 
HOSCOMM 
CONSTANT .8258 
(-.224) 
R-SQUARED .38699 
Model 2 
u.S. Loans to Sugar 
Growers Against Selected 
Economic and Political Variables 
.003*** 
(-3.709) 
.4158 
(.843) 
.0883* 
(-1.855) 
.8175 
(-.236) 
.6592 
(.452) 
.6570 
(-.455) 
.0004*** 
(-4.881) 
.6670 
(.441) 
.0076 
(3.200) 
.75022 
* Significant at .10 level; ***Significant at .01 level 
Discussion 
Modell, which contains only economic variables, explains approximately 39% of 
the variance for the amount of sugar subsidy loans. Although no independent variable 
proved to be statistically significant in this particular model, it only indicates that economic 
forces alone do not determine the level of sugar subsidy loan that is granted to sugar 
growers. Model 2 explains 37% more of the variance than Model 1 and a total of 75% of 
the variance in the level of loans allocated to sugar growers. 
- ..
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Despite the fact that the ratio of sugar production to total agricultural production 
increased from .09 in 1965 to .12 in 1992, no significant correlation with the level of sugar 
subsidy loans is reported. Likewise, domestic consumption of sugar does not affect the 
level of sugar subsidy loans. Consumption of sugar has decreased over time, beginning at 
97 pounds per capita, reaching a high of 103 pounds per capita in 1972 and 1973, and then 
rapidly decreasing to 64.9 pounds per capita in 1992. The reported significance level is 
.8175, strongly indicating that no correlation between the two variables exists. One 
possible reason why domestic demand does not affect the level of sugar loans lies in the 
u.s. 's tendency to dump excess sugar onto the world market. Canada is one of the prime 
markets that receives sugar from the United States. Both the international price of sugar 
and the ratio of U.S. sugar production to world sugar production are statistically significant 
in this model. 
Although the percent of U.S. sugar production to world production (WORLD) or 
the international price of sugar (lNT.$SUG) are statistically insignificant in the first model 
which included only economic variables, the inclusion of political variables render them 
statistically significant. When the impact of one independent variable depends on the value 
of another independent variable, an interaction effect exists. When testing for an interaction 
effect, it was found that joint effect of SENCOMM and INT.$SUG as well as SENCOMM 
and WORLD are statistically signific';lnt. One possible explanation for the linkage between 
these political and economic variables is that the Senate committee of Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry use economic data such as the international price of sugar, and the 
percent of U.S. sugar production to world sugar production when they decide not to 
support an increasing sugar loan rate. These findings would benefit from more in-depth 
research in the future. 
Some of the results for the political variables were surprising; as the number of 
Democrats who sit on the Senate Agriculture Committee and represent sugar producing 
states increases, the level of sugar subsidy decreases. Although this inverse relationship 
..
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may appear surprising, the structure of the Senate committee helps to explain their apparent 
lack of support of their constituents' desire to receive sugar loans. 
Senators, unlike the Representatives, serve on many committees and 
represent a broad cross section of economic interests. They tend to serve on many 
committees and enjoy a higher level of independence in what they want to politically pursue 
(Reiselbach 1994). The structure of the Senate committee demonstrates the medley of 
interests a senator is free to pursue. Unlike the House of Representatives, the senate does 
not have a committee which solely addresses agricultural topics. Instead, the committee 
addresses three very different domestic arenas; namely agriculture, nutrition, and forestry. 
Moreover, out of a possible 14 seats, only two senators from sugar producing states sat on 
the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry committee in 1965. Although the number of 
Senators who sat on the committee increased to nineteen in 1992, those from sugar 
producing states have never filled more than three seats at any given time between 1965­
1992. 
The Senate committee's lack of support of sugar loans is exacerbated by the fact 
that since 1971, the chair of the senate agricultural committee was not from a sugar 
producing state. Although the power of full committee chairs declined since the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1974, their influence is not to be overlooked. With such a small 
ratio of Senators from sugar producing states who sit on the Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry committee, their ability to influence sugar legislation could be drastically 
diminished. 
Another potential reason is that these Senators do not find it necessary to increase 
the level of sugar loans because this issue is not as significant to the future political 
viability. Hence, they do not make it their priority to champion this type of legislation. 
This assertion is supported by a series of events which occurred in the senate Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry committee. As of the end of October, 1995, the Senate plan for the 
sugar subsidy included imposing a penalty of 1 cent per pound on processors who forfeit 
•
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their sugar crop to the government. This in tum would reduce the loan rate by 1 cent per 
pound. 
Representatives, on the other hand, more often represent specific constituencies that 
may directly benefit from the loans for sugar. A representative's tenure in Congress is only 
guaranteed for two years, and often times they occupy only one committee seat. Their 
ability to bring "pork" like sugar loans back to their constituents determines the tenure of 
their career. Stigler posits that industries will actively seek regulation in an effort to shore 
up cartels, restrict market entry, and avoid antitrust prosecution. In return, they offer 
.political support to legislators in the form of money, votes, and campaign activity (Stigler, 
1974). Sugar PACs are a classic example of such activity, and as a recent study by the 
center for Public Integrity shows, these lobby organizations have given over 2.6 million 
dollars to congressional campaign committees between 1985 and 1990 (Wall Street Journal) 
26 July 1990). 
Graph 4 . 
PAC Money Donated to House Agriculture
 
Members from Sugar Producing States
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As shown in Graph 4, major sugar PACs increased their contributions to House 
Agricultural members who represent sugar producing states from a little under fifteen 
thousand dollars in 1974 to over eighty thousand dollars in 1992. 
•
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As sugar PACs know, there are strong political motivations behind the 
representatives who sit on the agricultural committee. Members motivated by constituency­
oriented concerns seek committees with jurisdictions salient to their constituents (Smith, 
1990). Such an orientation is not surprising because the jurisdiction of these committees is 
limited. Sugar is a prime example of a policy that affects a narrow jurisdiction of states, 
specifically those in the southeast and midwest US. but indirectly creates widely dispersed 
costs in the form of higher consumer prices. 
Although sugar subsidy loans do not cost the taxpayer a penny, they can still be 
viewed as pork because federal tax dollars are being directed to the legislators' 
constituency. This phenomena however, was not evident in the multiple regression, 
possibly due to the increasing power of subcommittees. 
Democratization vis-a-vis 1970s Congressional reforms increased the subcommittee 
members' opportunity to participate in congressional activity at the expense of the full 
committee. Since 1981, the House of Representatives formed the Cotton, Rice, and Sugar 
subcommittee, which quickly became the most salient committee in Congress regarding 
government support of the domestic sugar industry 3. The long-time subcommittee 
chairman represents a major sugar producing state (Louisiana), and roughly one half of the 
thirteen to fourteen members of the subcommittee come from sugar producing states. Due 
to the limited number of years that this subcommittee has existed, it is difficult to test its 
influence on the amount of sugar loans in a multiple regression. The influence of such a 
committee should be considered, however, in any analysis of what impacts sugar policy 
making. 
Although Democrats have traditionally supported farm subsidies in both chambers 
of Congress, the number of Democrats in either the House or Senate did not come out as 
statistically significant in Model 2. This in part could be due to the way in which 
3 The Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar of the House Committee on Agriculture is the key policy making 
body because the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrtion, and Forestry has no members from any of the major 
sugar producing states. 
•
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democratic support was measured in the regression. Due to the changing political 
atmosphere of Congress, Republicans are setting the agenda for committees such as the 
House Agriculture committee. As witnessed by Representative Dan Miller's seemingly 
brash move to not back the sugar subsidy program although it directly benefits his 
constituency, House and Senate Republicans are moving U.S. agriculture toward the free 
market (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995). Since 1977, the sugar program has 
been a part of the omnibus farm bill which includes provisions for more powerful and 
significant agricultural commodities such as com, wheat, and milk. The farm bill is a 
prime target for Republicans because it is a bureaucratic monolith that costs taxpayers 
billions, and it also ignores market realities and encourages destructive farm practices 
(Christian Science Monitor, 1995). 
Overall, many of the political variables which were supported with theoretical 
foundations did not emerge as statistically significant in these models. This does not mean, 
however, that all political institutions tested in this model do not directly affect the level of 
sugar loans; rather this reflects upon the simplicity of the models and the complex nature of 
political transactions. 
Loans are not the only means of politically crafted economic support for sugar 
growers. Price supports and import quotas have also undergone sweeping changes since 
1965 when the U.S. began to cultivate domestic production as its major source of sugar. 
From 1965 to 1974, Congress devised artificial price supports for sugar on the basis of its 
world market price. Yet, in 1974, Congress allowed the 40 year old sugar price support 
program to cease to exist due to heavy consumer pressures on Congress and partly to lobby 
overkill by domestic and foreign producers (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1974). 
19
 
Graph 5 
U.S. and World Price of Sugar
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Graph 5 shows how the domestic price support system began to outpace the international 
price of sugar at an increasing rate between 1965 and 1992. The price support system 
capped out "at 26 cents a pound in 1991 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1991). The 
international price, however, bottomed out at 4 cents a pound in 1985 and did not recover 
substantially from this decrease. By restricting U.S. consumer and sugar user purchases 
of world market sugar, the U.S. sugar program reduced the demand and diverted the 
supply on the world market, thereby helping to depress world market sugar prices 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1987). Third world countries, as mentioned earlier, are 
devastated by the U.S. 's economic manipulation of the world sugar market. 
In order to understand what are some of the political forces behind the level of 
domestic price support over time, a bivariate correlation was employed using the amount of 
sugar PAC money 4 contributed to House Agricultural members who represent sugar 
producing states and the price differential between domestic price supports and the world 
market price of sugar. The results of the correlation are a coefficient of 2.749 and a 
4 Sugar PAC money refers to the American Sugarbeet Organization, the American Sugar Cane League Political 
Action Committee, and the Sugar Cane League of the USA. These are three of the largest sugar PACs. 
•
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significance level of .0423, suggesting that there is a direct link between rising price 
supports and the increased amount of contributions sugar PACs give to House agriculture 
members. 
Import Quotas are often times utilized as a political means to stimulate or repress 
foreign sugar industries. The u.s. imposes trade embargoes on countries with 
controversial political systems such as Cuba, and also gives some foreign countries first 
priority in fulfilling the small niche of imported sugar that they allow to pass through their 
borders. Sugar import quotas fall at some point under the jurisdiction of the House 
Agriculture Committee and the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee. A 
bivariate correlation between senators from sugar producing states who sit on the 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee and the level of import quotas yields a 
significance level of .011 and a coefficient of -.2515. This suggests that as the number of 
senators from sugar producing states who sit on these salient committees increases over 
time, the amount of imported sugar that is allowed to pass through the U.S. decreases. 
Such findings would support the policy of protectionism which the U.S. has maintained 
regarding their sugar industry. 
U.S. law mandates that the U.S. import at least 1.25 million tons of sugar a year in 
order to meet trade obligations and ensure that foreign suppliers receive a share of the 
domestic market. When the domestic sugar market is not in danger of drought, the U.S. 
currently does not import much more than 1.25 million tons (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1995). 
As price supports and loan rates face extinction under the Republican chopping 
block, lawmakers are still wrangling over setting the import tonnage level at a level where 
sugar growers would still be able to forfeit sugar to the government for a guaranteed price 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995). Without a price floor, sugar growers would 
have to compete against world markets and would not benefit from a quota system. 
•
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Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Both economic and political forces, as the analysis shows, directly affect the u.s. 
sugar subsidy program. Although the data regarding sugar loans did not show many 
statistically significant correlations with political institutions, the political variables included 
in Model 2 explained about 50% of the total variance of loans, lending support to North's 
theory that political institutions autonomously affect policy outcome. As the structure of 
many political institutions changes, so does the support of the sugar subsidy. With a 
higher number of Republicans controlling the salient agriculture committees and committing 
themselves towards the party line which prioritizes the budget bill over constituency 
interests, the process of the political exchange was at times different than expected. 
Nevertheless, sugar loans, price supports, and import quotas are all manipulated by 
political actors. 
The rate at which domestic price supports increased over the world price of sugar is 
a revealing example of how inefficient the sugar industry operates. Basic supply and 
demand theory is set aside for the pursuit of political ends as witnessed by how PAC 
money plays a role in defining the economic outcome of sugar policy. 
Import Quotas act as a weighty political tool for the u.s. to wield when it wants to 
affect the economic viability of a foreign country. Perhaps a more economically efficient 
approach towards the u.s. sugar subsidy program is to create a more uniform and 
comprehensive policy that brings domestic policy into line with u.s. international trade 
policy (Monahan, 1992). 
A gradual reduction in the loan rate will bring the differential between u.s. sugar 
prices in line with world prices (Graph 4). This will naturally spur inefficient producers to 
drop out of the domestic market, allowing foreign sugar industries to revitalize and capture 
some of the lost market share in both the world and u.s. sugar market. 
By splitting the sugar program into three different sectors, it is difficult to modify 
one without affecting another; consequently, as the Republicans shift agricultural policy 
•
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towards a free market, all aspects of the sugar policy will be affected. The political 
repercussions of this shift in desired policy outcome, however, is yet to be observed. This 
sugar subsidy program deserves continued attention in the spring as the both the budget bill 
and omnibus farm bill are put into action and the politicians campaign for constituency 
support in the next election. 
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